Author: rogerwang original source: http: //forums.gamespot.com.cn/viewthread.php tid = 54249?
About domestic online games. Almost all old qualifications and players with some qualities will regret to the current domestic online game industry. And everyone is particularly regrettable, which includes the general low quality of Chinese players. Including plug-in and private service in online games, many players lack the most basic moral specification, showing very low quality. And thereby let the entire online game on the back. Not only in the mainstream public opinion, but even in the player group, online game players are also seen as a group of low quality and lack of cultivation. I think this is not a problem with online games. This phenomenon can actually use a class ratio or extended by lemon market theory.
But first we should clarify the most obvious difference between online games and single games. That is, the content of a single game is defined by the game producer, and the content of the online game is defined by the player. Therefore, the quality of the player directly determines the quality of the online game.
Suppose we have a online game as an independent system. People can enter or leave this online game. In other words, the player's entry and leaving is completely free, there is no viscosity or other influencing factors. Of course, this is indisputable in reality, but thus considering it easier. The quality of the player is very good. And there is such a hypothesis: the player is positively related to the quality of the game quality and the quality of the player. That is to say, the highest quality of the players is also the highest in the quality of the game quality. And, if the quality of the game is lower than the player's request, the player will leave the game. This is often seen in reality. A high quality person, special lack of patience in life or low-quality people in the game and lack of moral behavior. And for the purpose of Ming Zhe, you will stay away from this phenomenon. That is, qd = f (q). For the sake of simplicity, we temporarily blamed QD = Q. It can be proved that this assumption does not affect the result of the basic conclusion. And assuming that the quality of the online game is equal to the average of the quality of all the players of the online game. This assumption is also acceptable due to the main characteristics of the online games already given above.
Introduced some premise, now you can start narrow my thoughts. Suppose we have a online game, with a different quality player. There is a discrete distribution. It is both the quality of QMIN to QMIN to QMAX. Accordingly, the player's requirements are discrete distribution, from the lowest QDMIN to the highest QDMAX, because QD = Q, so It is from Qmin to Qmax. The quality of the game is equal to the average of all players, remembers QA, QMIN Therefore, the most stable state of a online game is the status of only the lowest quality players. Any other state, the average quality has a decrease. And when this steady state is reached, this state is stable because the quality of players with high quality will not enter. That is to say, the lowest quality players will expel the quality players, then the quality is high, higher, medium and poor. This idea, and the law of lemon markets and Glescy seems to have. However, there is different. Lemon market and Glesin's law are based on market mechanisms and price mechanisms. In the two theories, the exit of the high-quality older or high exchange means is due to the price of the market below their cost. Here, the exit of the quality high player is because of the quality of the overall environment provided by other players, that is, all the average quality of all players is lower than the environmental requirements. There is a hypothesis impact on conclusions. QD = Q. According to this assumption, it is that there is only the lowest quality player in the game but if Qd is equal to a constant, it may be set to QA, then the above derivation will not be established. All players will stay in the game. Similarly, the modification of this function will change the conclusion. However, as long as the F (q) in QD = f (q) is a monotonous increase function, then the basic conclusion of low quality players expels high quality players will remain unchanged. Change is just the extent to which it is expelled. But here there is an exception: if F (qmax) <= QA, the quality of the highest player's average quality of the player is below or equal to the current average quality, then this system will also stabilize. Further discussion of this theory may result in other more interesting results. But only on the current stage, we can already explain some simple facts: I want to build a player's overall online game in a place where the quality gap is very large. If it is not supplemented to some other means, it is impossible. . Under normal circumstances, online games grow with scale, high-quality players will continue to be elapped, so the quality of the game will continue to fall. So many people will like to go some games that have just started testing, because the expelter process has not yet begun. And if the market can only receive the game products above the game of the lowest quality players, then they can be sure that life of each online game is very limited. Because it will be flooded by the low quality players who expel high quality players. And those high-quality players, there will be many new games. So each online game has a certain life cycle. / / Who is "lemon"? ---- Information economics's wisdom revelation (forgotten the original, please forgive me) If a friend asked me, can I talk about what information economics is told by a sentence. I said, this is too difficult, maybe I can ask you a question: "Are you 'Lemon'?" "Lemon, who is lemon?" Friends confused, I laughed: "Sorry. ' Lemon 'The word economist knows that people don't know that there must be a counterfeit goods. We all know that you don't know, this is used in information economics, that is, there is an asymmetrical problem between us. Information asymmetry is the major discovery of information economics. This year, three professors have just got the Nobel economics award because of this contribution. Of course, don't think that the information is asymmetric is all information economics. Don't think that the information is asymmetric. In fact, everyone knows, and mistakenly thinks that Nobel's Economics Award is easy. " Looking at the friend has fallen into the "trap" of information economics, I will continue to talk. Among the proverbs of the United States, "lemony" is the meaning of "defective" or "non-neutral products". In the 1960s, EEA Aklov was the concept of "The Market for Lemons", analysis and refining "information asymmetry" from the old car market. It is important to say that China has ancient training, and the Chinese people have long, and the Chinese people have long, and they will be familiar with information economics. Unfortunately, there is no Chinese who think about this, especially for the market economy, so the Chinese will never get the Nobel Prize. Aklov is different. He continued to ponder in the deep deep. This is unsatisfactory, he found the problem: because the buyer's seller has information asymmetry for the "old car" to be traded, the buyer usually does not want to have a high price, so that the seller who holds a good car has to choose to exit the market, market The rest will be a bad car, the buyer is increasingly reluctant to patronize, and the old car market will eventually shrink or end the easter. Aklov's detailed argument has many introductions, you can find it casually, I will not say much. What I want to say is, "Tiger's self-owned people", Aklov's discovery, especially the concept of "information asymmetry", later affected a large number of economists, everyone according to Tuo, hockey land Many "lemon markets" were discovered successively. For example, the economist Sbins found that the talent market was actually a "lemon market": due to the information asymmetry, the employer is willing to open a lower salary, except for mediocre "lemon", it can't meet the needs of elite talents. As a result, there was a phenomenon of inferior currency. There is also the long-awaited squid, Sticitz, often opened, often opened, and the credit market is also a "lemon market": because the information is asymmetrical, the lender has to determine a higher interest rate, good results The company's enterprise retreats, and the bad roots do not want to pay off the loan, but swarming like fans.
