Talk about the comprehensive articles of the cross-station script attack

xiaoxiao2021-03-06  92

Original URL: http: //www.e3i5.com/html/2004-6-18/2004618171625.htmhttp: //wvw.ttian.net/article/show.php id = 164 Author:? Feng Qingyang Recently, due to the Find some sites still exist of UBB cross-station script attacks. Although cross-station script attacks rarely cause some of the more affected services, for a site, there is such a vulnerability. It is too not worth it! Small Then, what is going out, change the homepage; the main page is changed; he will steal the user's cookies information, and it will gly off the browser's hard drive. A site is turned into a malicious website, who dares? If you add "blind", it is not messy. Do you really make a site so that you can see the so-called cross-station script attack? What kind of attack mode will be made. Enter a site containing UBB features, such as message board, forum, or site with submission procedures. First, tell the simplest script attack: and other HTML characters Filtering problem. Log in to a CGI production site. Looking at the CGI site with the original ASP's eyes, I feel that the filtering of the script should be very good. So I first test. Fill in the user column After registration, I didn't propose illegal characters. After the registration is completed, click on the information and find the page deformation. If you fill in other countries, you will have the same problem, that page can't look. Changed a site, then submit The illegal character prompt appeared, it seems that the site is the <> other HTML script characters that have been filtered, that's fine, we use the ASCII code to replace <> like & # 60; & # 62 After instead of submission, then there has been the case of the above page deformation. It seems that the illegal filtering mechanism is not very perfect. What is even, I found that there is no word size when I have a name bar in a site, no filtering any Illegal characters, if I submit something malicious code, I still don't fulfill me? Simple script attacks such as and other HTML formats must be filtered, some sites have not been involved in UBB. That Let's take a focus on the problem of UBB filtering vulnerability. UBB is a format symbol used to replace HTML editing in the forum, such as [B] [/ B] can be replaced into in HTML. However, this replacement problem has become the best accumulation of cross-station script attacks. Test an ASP message and a whole station program code: Primary question: [URL] filtering, when submitting the code Build a malicious code for the onmouseover function, since the onmouseover can take effect, then there is Do you not do it? Some original programs are simply submitted to S2 "Target = _BLANK> S2" TARGET = _BLANK> S2 "TARGET = _BLANK> S2" TARGET = _BLANK> S2 "TARGET = _BLANK> S2 . To so-in-that we can use & # 34; instead of ", we will use it" and then use the ONMOUSEOVER function to operate, consequences? You should know !: p [img] filter, this is true It is an old difficult problem. It was a very early time [IMG] script attack. In this test, many sites still still exist this vulnerability. A bit of programs are not filtered at all, especially some free message boards There are many problems. Below we mainly [IMG] tag problem: very simple [img] javascript: alert (); [/ img] Submitted code to convert the code to , Good, here we can see JavaScript: alert (); is activated by ","> ") STRER = Replace (STRER," "," "" Space STRER = Replace (STRER, CHR (9), "") 'TABLE STRER = Replace (STRER, "'", "'") 'Single number strer = replace (STRER, "" "", "" ")' Double Quartent Dim Re, Re_v Re_v =" [^ / (/) /; / '; "" / [] * "' re_v =". [^ / [] * "set re = new regexp Re.ignorecase = true re.global = true re.pattern =" (javaScript :) "STRER = RE .Replace (STRER) (STRER, JavaScript: ") Re.pattern =" (JavaScript) "STRER = RE.REPLACE (STRER," JavaScript ") Re.pattern =" (JScript :) "STRER = RE.REPLACE (STRER," JScript: ") RE.PATTERN =" (JS :) "STRER = RE.REPLACE (STRER, JS:") Re.pattern = "" STRER = Re.Replace (STRER, "Value") RE. Pattern = "(About: "STRER = RE.REPLACE (STRER," about: ") RE.PATTERN =" (file :) "STRER = RE.REPLACE (STRER," File &: ") Re.pattern =" (Document.) "STRER = Re.Replace (STRER, "Document:") Re.pattern = "(vbscript :)" STRER = Re.Replace (STRER, "VBScript:") Re.pattern = "(VBS :)" STRER =


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