Wu Ying gives UT Starcon's dysfunction: Savior needs to be small
Under the pressure of 3G coming and the small Songtong market, UT Starka has a repeated miracle to return myths.
46-year-old Wu Yechui turned green. In the last season in 2004, Xiaomingtong's unexpected emerged. UT Starcon has reduced the first loss in history because of the equipment capital of the operator. The small Songtong market shrinks, the overall growth, the profit reduction, the stock price falls, the shareholders are painful, began to sue, the chairman of the company, Wu Hou, had to run away from the Asia Pacific "Fire".
Before this, this company was born in Silicon Valley with an impressive record. It creates a miracle in the sluggish telecommunications market, 2000 to 2004, the total amount of the global telecom market fell about 5%, the Chinese market is flat, Lucent, Northeast and other old-fashioned equipment merchants have troubles. And in these five years, UT Starcon maintains an average annual complex growth, and the operation rate is about 10%; the total income of $ 2.7 billion in 2003. This 15-year history company has stabilized the world's 10 telecom equipment. Column; On the other hand, Wu Eagou also invested more personal colors to this company. This company is considered to be a successful case in achieving dreams in China. The founder Wu Eagle has experience in China's growth and returning to the country, which makes him combine a technology in foreign countries, and the particulars of the China Telecom market. This combination has changed the China Telecom market and created UT Stark.
In more indigenous people, UT is still within the age of 2004. For such a company that has been surprisingly, how is the UT to achieve the transition to the 3G era and achieve cooperation with operators? Not only that, how to achieve comprehensive flowering in China and Japan, the internal growth should be integrated, and the balance of broadband and wireless business is integrated.
"The problem has already remedied that it is already too late. We have long been foreseen, and take action." Wu Hawn said.
Limited
The rise of UT Starka occurs in the global telecom market downturn. Since 2000 to 2004, the total amount of the global telecom market fell about 5%, and many old-fashioned equipment companies such as the Chinese market, Lucent and Nortel. And in these five years, UT Starcon maintains an average annual compound growth, and the operation rate is about 10%; last year's total revenue is $ 2.7 billion, this 15-year history company firmly ranks among the top 10 telecommunications equipment companies in the world. .
Such contrast, derived from a special product and a special market: Tab is in China. Prior to 2004, 90% of its business came from China, and 90% of China's business came from Tony.
"The Battle of the Gods" is the background of Little Songtong. Mid
Dynamic and China Unicom shifts over the past few years
At the same time as the well-blown sea of operation, China Telecom and China Netcom have not been moved.
I have been annoyed on the side of the card. After all, the fixed-line business is like a disabled. At this time, Wu Ying, unknown, and his little Songtong appeared.
In just 4 years, Xiaomingtong users approached 70 million, higher than movement
Move user. UT Starka still occupies 60% of its system markets and more than 50% of the terminal market. The rest were subsequently followed by ZTE and Lronto.
And when the fixed-line operator gets 3G shift
After the license plate, the "God of God" that Xiao Shuotong rely on the "God of God" will be larger, and telecommunications and Netcom have to invest and kill around 3G. Who will care about Tony?
After the peak of 2004, the market covered by Small Songtong is full. In 2004, the new users added 32.5 million new users. It is estimated that the new increase of 1000, 700, and 3 million in three years. In 2007, the total stagnation is stable in 90.5 million. As the user's incremental decreases, the operator's equipment investment will shrink sharply. It is expected that investment in 2005 accounts for only 1/3 of 2004, and three consecutive years are 104, 37 and 1.8 billion. This is a buffet of UT Starka's current 20 billion plates. The conditions that UT Starka seem to becomes a disadvantage. Because of the small-lived technology, the performance is unstable, so it is not being dedicated to the famous door, and it is a tool for the surprise of the young generation. But in this reason, technical defects have become the reason why it is abandoned in the 3G era, and UT Star Kang, the "sword walking" does not have experience in the formal battlefield of 3G.
Is UT Starka, which is the rise in the global telecom market, will happen when the 3G feast arrives? This sounds indeed a harmonious paradox.
A ring is still a bell
Wu Ying is very taboo that others use "steering" to describe UT Star Kang, "said that the turn seems to show that we don't do small Songtong, but we still have to do it." Wu Ying used the word "transformation", outside the small Songtong More than a few legs.
Start in 2001, "Growth Problem in Xialing Times" appeared in Wuying's strategic framework, from that, Japanese broadband and CDMA chain became the "another dragon" of UT Stark decided to cultivate. The 1997, 3G R & D has been launched in the 4 years.
Relying on Chairman Lu Hongliang and Japan's heads of grandson Justice, UT Starcon and Yahoo's Japanese cooperative broadband project; started in 2001, and has been nearly $ 400 million in the revenue from 2001. However, broadband business is fierce in Japan, and profits are not rich. And the revenue of 400 million US dollars is unable to become a pillar for the current 2.7 billion total tray. Also, the island is like Japanese broadband business with China's small low-pass and future 3G do not exist.
Since 2000, UT Starkang is a total of 20 acquisitions for channels, research and development, products, etc. in the United States, South Korea, attempts to create a CDMA solution from the system, equipment, to the terminal, the end, the end, which is UT. Starcon's foundation of the 3G Times stationed. However, the integration of mergers and acquisitions is quite hard, and UT Stark has not proved that they have large-scale delivery. Instead, Nokia, NEC, Motorola and other global strong people and Huawei, ZTE's leadership, all have a long time in this field, they move
Dynamic equipment experience and 3G investment are also far as UT Starcon.
At the end of the 2004, only because of the revenue reduction of small Songtong, it directly leads to the overall loss of the entire business, and it has been sufficient to meet the universal profitability of UT Star Kang in the non-hunting business.
For the way, Wu Ying gives a simple, amazing, but also logical: or small Lingtong. This seems to be seen by Wu Eagle as a kit with the Savior.
The primary is the capital. UT Starkang has worked for 8 years in 3G, and its investment has exceeded the small Lingtong itself. At the same time, in China's 70 million small low-pass users, 10 more than 10,000 users of users, and more than 500,000 users, such a large-scale core base station operation experience is not very common, this can be 3G operations. Provide unique experience support.
If funds and experiences are to deal with 3G, then an aggressive weapon is one of the 3G standards of WCDMA and the small pony. UT Starcon's practice is to facilitate WCDMA and Small Songtong's automatic mutual transfer, so that Small Lingtong can make up for the blind spot at the time of construction of WCDMA network. Plus the terminal, that is, the small Spirit / CDMA dual-mode mobile phone is being launched, Wu Ying expects that this can achieve the seamless connection of WCDMA and Small Songtong.
As mentioned above, it became the trick of UT Starka once again bound "old ally" telecommunications and Netcom. Wu Ying Note WCDMA is because I firmly believe that telecommunications and Netcom will "100%" get a WCDMA license. And "they are difficult to shift
Move and Unicom users, because of the huge costs; the easiest way is to transition to 3G through dual-mode. "Once bound" old ally ", UT Star Kang will naturally share 3G. If Zhang Ying, General Manager of Yi Guan International Consultant, even if the market conditions of the 3G Times, the market conditions of Tamarot, did not change. Origin The payment ability does not increase significantly, so the low-end demand of "cheap phones, using cheap mobile phones" is still effective. The user base of Little Songtong continues to exist, telecommunications and Netcom will continue to imagine this group, and UT Starkone "Small Lingtong" card continues to be effective.
This has become the UTSda Kangming Knowing the Little Lingtong Equipment market will shrink, but still continuously investigate the root cause of investment. The contrast is that ZTE in the small Songtong market is in the early 2004 emergency brakes, and it breaks all the R & D of Xiaolongtong; only milking, does not feed, and the earned cash is put into 3G.
"Our core competitiveness is innovation, and it is impossible to succeed with the same road behind people." Wu Hawn said.
Can the operation management be kept?
If the fade of Tamingtong is a fate of a product, then Wu Ying is nothing more than grafting its advantages to subsequent products. And if the business and strategic layout is a single defect in UT Starcon as a company, then its growth is also a process of overcoming this defect.
2004 is a watershed. This year, the small Lingtong business fell from 86% of the previous year to 63%; the number of employees of the company has increased to 7,600 in the end of the year, with an increase of 38%, and the whole is nearly "crazy" to prepare 3G. In this year, Wu Ying looked forward to the proportion of Small Songtong's business below 40%, and the US-Japanese market contributed 1.5 billion camp, and the CDMA industry chain completed integration.
But everyone knows how these changes mean.
As a subsessive talker in the telecommunications, UT Starkang is hard to rely across the inner accumulation to achieve the breakthrough of the multi-war line, so, it is necessary to borrow mergers to expand the CDMA product chain. Two years after listed financing in 1999, holding a currency treatment; two years, began to try a small acquisition of $ 10 million; later, start frequent operation such as Equipment for Equipment, ACC, etc.
It is inevitable. UT Starkon has been touched by a company's excellent technology and talent, but it has been found after the acquisition, which is difficult to support the product sales of the company at the time of the technical support and service level. Finally, the target market has not been implemented, and those who enter the mergers and acquisitions are dispersed to other departments. "Some things are very good, you are not suitable for having", this is the lesson learned by Wu Ying.
In this step-by-step, UT Starka gradually accumulated cultural integration capabilities and operational international companies. But this point is startup in the US market, listed in the United States, and the UTS-Dang, which has an international occupational management team, relative to the advantages of domestic opponents. In 2004, in Japan, the United States and the United States were 600 million camps, which gave Wu Hawge a sense of superiority relative to Huawei and ZTE.
At the date, the establishment of two business lines, exacerbated the requirements of the company's internal refinement management. On January 1, 2005, UT Starcon set up three business units, and the establishment of the technical service department supported. Wu Ying said that the basic functions such as finance, personnel will serve the three business sections, such as the independent accounting of financial statements, "R & D, sales have spent much, whether it is profitable, to be clear."
Follow these business lines, process and architecture increasingly full, company personnel expansion, and the required management capabilities are also increasing. The number of UT Starco employees has grown rapidly, only 38% a year in 2004, while most of them are difficult to manage; the current 19 vice presidents, 8 are introduced from the outside.
Wu Ying, a message "I am not suitable for staying in this position", in 2004, gave Zhou Yining, and finally the name was coming out of the first line. In fact, Zhou has always been a COO, which is fully controlled by day-to-day operations. Wuying who claims to be "high-quality, sensitive, good at people who have been dealing with people" focused on the mining and cultivation of the next generation of management, giving a government relationship, and strategy development. However, even such maintenance and improvement, the fallback speed has caused the problem that has been covered by a few years of high-speed growth surface. Wu Ying frankly, these even seriously went to the "customer proposed return", exposed the company's deprecated processes and management hazards. "So, sales growth speed is not all bad things to a business, we can take the opportunity to strengthen management." Wu Hawn said, "So, this year we emphasize efficiency rather than blind growth."
Ut Starkang's situation in the 3G era, many of the so-called industry professionals are not optimistic, but they don't dare to break their failure. After all, no one is awkward for a company that is surprisingly.
However, although Wu Hawn still has the core ability of UT Starka, the critical criticism of the outside world will refer to the risk of seeking stability and not betting. Strive to balance the tendency to be a lack of examples: I want to flow in the Sino-Japanese and American three countries, the front of 33 countries, broadband and wireless should be, internal growth should be integrated with mergers and acquisitions ... Since balance, it is no longer paranoid.
Mohiso is white, but will there be another day again?
Table 1: Small Songtong users and equipment investment forecast
2004 2006 2006 2007
Number of users (unit: 10) 6800 7985 8702 9041
Add number (unit: 10) 3250 1185 717 339
Operator equipment investment (unit: 100 million) 104 37 19 8
Note: Data is provided by Yi Guan International Consultation
Table 2: UT Starkon Financial Indicators (Units: Million Dollars)
Net income growth rate Operation profit rate China business proportion
2001 627 70% 12% 90%
2002 982 57% 15% 84%
2003, 1964 100% 14% 85%
2004 2700 38% 4% 79%
Note: In 2003, the previous data was taken from the UT Star Kiannian report; 2004 data is estimated by the "Chinese entrepreneurs"
